Channels

Many channels. One agent. Credentials cannot cross.

What the channel layer does

Wirken routes messages from named chat surfaces to one agent that answers to you. Each channel runs in its own adapter process with its own platform credentials, and the switchboard authenticates the channel identity on every IPC frame. You decide which channels exist; the channels never decide on your behalf.

The adapters

Each adapter is an independent Cargo crate that converts platform messages to and from the same Cap'n Proto frame the switchboard expects. The set:

Telegram
Bot account against the Telegram Bot API, via teloxide.
Discord
Bot user in server channels, via serenity.
Slack
Workspace bot from a Slack app, via slack-morphism.
Microsoft Teams
Bot Framework bot serving a Teams tenant over HTTPS webhook.
Matrix
Account on a Matrix homeserver, long-poll sync.
WhatsApp
Meta Cloud API business endpoint with HMAC-validated inbound webhooks.
Signal
Local signal-cli daemon bridge over a Unix domain socket. Linux and macOS only.
Google Chat
Google Workspace Chat app with JWT-verified inbound and bearer-token outbound.
iMessage
BlueBubbles bridge running on a paired Mac.
WebChat
Local browser surface served by the switchboard on 127.0.0.1.

Adding a channel means writing one more crate against the same trait set. The switchboard does not care which channel a frame arrived on, as long as it can prove the frame arrived on the channel the connection authenticated as.

Cross-channel isolation

AuthenticatedChannel is the channel a connection resolved to during the Ed25519 handshake; the gateway sets it once and checks every inbound frame against it. SessionHandle<C: Channel> is a session reference parameterized by a channel marker; SessionHandle<Telegram> and SessionHandle<Discord> are distinct Rust types. That typed handle is not used on the production message path: there, crossing channels is refused by a runtime check, not by the compiler.

pub trait Channel: Send + Sync + 'static {
    fn id() -> &'static str;
}

pub struct AuthenticatedChannel(String);

pub struct SessionHandle<C: Channel> {
    id: SessionId,
    _channel: PhantomData<C>,
}

A function that takes a SessionHandle<Telegram> does not accept a SessionHandle<Discord>. On the production path the gateway runs AuthenticatedChannel::require_match on every inbound frame, which refuses a mismatch and writes it to the audit chain. The credentials handed to an adapter are that adapter's own.

What lands in the audit log

A tool call is written to the session's hash chain before it runs, and its result after. Three rows from one session, as wirken audit log --format json prints them:

{
  "action": "assistant_tool_calls",
  "actor_id": "",
  "actor_kind": "user",
  "channel": null,
  "detail": {
    "agent_id": "default",
    "calls": [
      {
        "arguments": "{}",
        "id": "call_hg7477ku",
        "name": "list_files"
      },
      {
        "arguments": "{\"path\":\"notes.txt\"}",
        "id": "call_p4wj64k5",
        "name": "read_file"
      }
    ]
  },
  "hash": "b3169cf11e36d52de1b5f6c8cc93aac67b1be4e31bd6f083bd2e684f08150304",
  "id": 9,
  "session": {
    "full": "default"
  },
  "target": "",
  "ts": "2026-11-12T01:42:15.275320760+00:00"
}

{
  "action": "tool_result",
  "actor_id": "",
  "actor_kind": "user",
  "channel": null,
  "detail": {
    "agent_id": "default",
    "call_id": "call_hg7477ku",
    "output": "notes.txt",
    "success": true,
    "tool_name": "list_files"
  },
  "hash": "e7a78eb66c755906cdfd567ccbccb2b730e16a01f507922a4b4ee439662e1d97",
  "id": 11,
  "session": {
    "full": "default"
  },
  "target": "",
  "ts": "2026-11-12T01:42:15.275852070+00:00"
}

{
  "action": "llm_request",
  "actor_id": "",
  "actor_kind": "user",
  "channel": null,
  "detail": {
    "agent_id": "default",
    "messages_hash": "b4d0ed4a5cb823cffba6fe2e83998c53195bf1c639835e8b09b07b2efee2ab67",
    "model": "qwen2.5:7b",
    "provider": "ollama",
    "request_bytes": 6690,
    "request_id": "req-c2739452-14a2-47fc-a864-e422a992bd14",
    "tools_hash": "d3e9d3691a34b13620f3e353b9a35c71d903f2e971ce8be7cd1650f1bd04b75d",
    "tools_hash_version": "v2"
  },
  "hash": "db1f59c1ea90284ed3a14153eaa95cc899d07d6ade5d465f144a188e82d56ae1",
  "id": 13,
  "session": {
    "full": "default"
  },
  "target": "",
  "ts": "2026-11-12T01:42:15.276797579+00:00"
}

Each row's hash covers the row before it, so changing a row changes every hash after it. Removing rows from the end of a session is not detected by the chain itself.

SIEM forwarding

The same typed events feed a SIEM forwarder when one is configured. Datadog, Splunk HEC, Microsoft Sentinel, and any HTTPS webhook are first-class targets. Events ship after they land in the chain, so the SIEM stream and your local audit log are independent views of the same record.

If you want structured ingestion, choose typed events. If you already have a normalizer pointed at a generic webhook, keep using it.

Verify a session offline

wirken sessions verify reads the session's rows, recomputes message hashes, re-runs read_file and list_files against the current workspace, and reports any divergence.

$ wirken sessions verify default

  wirken sessions verify default
  ──────────────────────
  agent: default
  Note: deterministic tools (read_file, list_files) are re-executed against the
        CURRENT workspace, not the workspace state at the time of execution.

  events_total:        13
  events_verified:     11
  events_unverifiable: 2
  events_divergent:    0
  chain:               OK (13 rows)

Chain-head Ed25519 signatures are checked with wirken audit verify, which walks every session's chain and verifies the signature on each head. Checking against a copy of the public key kept off the machine is what detects a rewrite by a process running as the same user.